fix: auth review fixes — token revocation, WS auth, seeding, and hardening
Refresh/logout and token robustness - drop the post-rotation refresh_tokens row delete in auth_refresh so logout blacklists the current (rotated) refresh token; remove the dead _clear_refresh_token_after_rotation helper and clear_active_refresh_token - reject non-object JWT payloads in _extract_unverified_sub so crafted Authorization headers return 401 instead of crashing with 500 SQLite user store - make builtin-admin seeding idempotent: on a concurrent first start the losing seeder re-checks, finds the winner, and returns instead of raising IntegrityError - per-thread sqlite connections + busy_timeout so Flask worker threads don't hit cross-thread ProgrammingError / SQLITE_BUSY - add LogsDirectory + /var/log/vacuum-wall to ReadWritePaths in both systemd units so the fallback admin password actually lands on disk Frontend - skip apiFetch 401-recovery for public auth endpoints so a failed login no longer logs out a valid session - add /passkeys to the nav (passkey registration was unreachable); remove the dead checkWebAuthnCapable export - drop the CSP-blocked inline WS-URL script and the __WS_URL_PLACEHOLDER__ plumbing; the WS URL is derived from location Daemon / WS - parse Sec-WebSocket-Protocol manually (web.Request.get_subprotocols does not exist in aiohttp 3.13); X-Auth-Token is a custom-nginx fallback only — docstring and security docs corrected Install / system - bootstrap_auth.py is now idempotent: preserves existing auth config and syncs the admin password on re-runs (new reset_password helper) - WebUI server block renders auth_basic off (the UI is JWT-protected) - install.sh chown/chmod skips .git to avoid git dubious-ownership breakage - tolerate unreadable /etc/wireguard during system import Contracts / docs - create_user returns 409 on duplicate username per docs/api.md - correct docs/api.md response shapes, docs/security.md blacklist cleanup wording + one-refresh-per-user caveat, stale WS-URL references, and the .htpasswd description Tests: +7 regression tests (rotation/logout revocation, crafted-token 401, concurrent seeding); placeholder-substitution tests replaced with serve-as-is SPA root tests.
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@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ from lib.auth import (
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blacklist_token,
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check_login_rate,
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check_webauthn_rate,
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clear_active_refresh_token,
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generate_tokens,
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get_access_ttl,
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record_login_failure,
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@@ -70,11 +69,6 @@ from lib.webauthn import (
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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def _clear_refresh_token_after_rotation(username: str) -> None:
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"""Remove the user's entry from refresh_tokens after a successful refresh rotation."""
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clear_active_refresh_token(username)
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@registry.register(POST_AUTH_LOGIN)
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def auth_login(_request: Any, body: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
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"""Handle user login.
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@@ -196,8 +190,6 @@ def auth_refresh(_request: Any, body: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
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jti = payload.get("jti")
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if jti:
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blacklist_token(jti, token_type="refresh")
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if username:
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_clear_refresh_token_after_rotation(username)
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return {
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"tokens": tokens,
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