fix: auth review fixes — token revocation, WS auth, seeding, and hardening
Refresh/logout and token robustness - drop the post-rotation refresh_tokens row delete in auth_refresh so logout blacklists the current (rotated) refresh token; remove the dead _clear_refresh_token_after_rotation helper and clear_active_refresh_token - reject non-object JWT payloads in _extract_unverified_sub so crafted Authorization headers return 401 instead of crashing with 500 SQLite user store - make builtin-admin seeding idempotent: on a concurrent first start the losing seeder re-checks, finds the winner, and returns instead of raising IntegrityError - per-thread sqlite connections + busy_timeout so Flask worker threads don't hit cross-thread ProgrammingError / SQLITE_BUSY - add LogsDirectory + /var/log/vacuum-wall to ReadWritePaths in both systemd units so the fallback admin password actually lands on disk Frontend - skip apiFetch 401-recovery for public auth endpoints so a failed login no longer logs out a valid session - add /passkeys to the nav (passkey registration was unreachable); remove the dead checkWebAuthnCapable export - drop the CSP-blocked inline WS-URL script and the __WS_URL_PLACEHOLDER__ plumbing; the WS URL is derived from location Daemon / WS - parse Sec-WebSocket-Protocol manually (web.Request.get_subprotocols does not exist in aiohttp 3.13); X-Auth-Token is a custom-nginx fallback only — docstring and security docs corrected Install / system - bootstrap_auth.py is now idempotent: preserves existing auth config and syncs the admin password on re-runs (new reset_password helper) - WebUI server block renders auth_basic off (the UI is JWT-protected) - install.sh chown/chmod skips .git to avoid git dubious-ownership breakage - tolerate unreadable /etc/wireguard during system import Contracts / docs - create_user returns 409 on duplicate username per docs/api.md - correct docs/api.md response shapes, docs/security.md blacklist cleanup wording + one-refresh-per-user caveat, stale WS-URL references, and the .htpasswd description Tests: +7 regression tests (rotation/logout revocation, crafted-token 401, concurrent seeding); placeholder-substitution tests replaced with serve-as-is SPA root tests.
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+12
-5
@@ -375,17 +375,24 @@ async def _handle_ws(request: web.Request) -> web.Response:
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Authentication: JWT access token passed via:
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1. WebSocket subprotocol header (Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: "Bearer <token>")
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2. X-Auth-Token header (nginx-injected)
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— the bundled client path.
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2. X-Auth-Token header — fallback for custom nginx setups that inject it
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(not set by the bundled nginx config).
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"""
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from aiohttp import hdrs
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from lib.auth import validate_token
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token_param = None
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matched_proto = None
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# Prefer subprotocol header (client JS sends "Bearer <token>")
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subprotocols = request.get_subprotocols()
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for proto in subprotocols or []:
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if proto and proto.startswith("Bearer "):
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# Prefer subprotocol header (client JS sends "Bearer <token>").
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# Sec-WebSocket-Protocol is a comma-separated list; parse it the same
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# way aiohttp's own handshake does (Request has no subprotocol helper).
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protocol_header = request.headers.get(hdrs.SEC_WEBSOCKET_PROTOCOL, "")
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subprotocols = [p.strip() for p in protocol_header.split(",") if p.strip()]
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for proto in subprotocols:
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if proto.startswith("Bearer "):
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token_param = proto[7:]
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matched_proto = proto
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break
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