fix: auth review fixes — token revocation, WS auth, seeding, and hardening

Refresh/logout and token robustness
- drop the post-rotation refresh_tokens row delete in auth_refresh so
  logout blacklists the current (rotated) refresh token; remove the
  dead _clear_refresh_token_after_rotation helper and clear_active_refresh_token
- reject non-object JWT payloads in _extract_unverified_sub so crafted
  Authorization headers return 401 instead of crashing with 500

SQLite user store
- make builtin-admin seeding idempotent: on a concurrent first start the
  losing seeder re-checks, finds the winner, and returns instead of
  raising IntegrityError
- per-thread sqlite connections + busy_timeout so Flask worker threads
  don't hit cross-thread ProgrammingError / SQLITE_BUSY
- add LogsDirectory + /var/log/vacuum-wall to ReadWritePaths in both
  systemd units so the fallback admin password actually lands on disk

Frontend
- skip apiFetch 401-recovery for public auth endpoints so a failed
  login no longer logs out a valid session
- add /passkeys to the nav (passkey registration was unreachable);
  remove the dead checkWebAuthnCapable export
- drop the CSP-blocked inline WS-URL script and the
  __WS_URL_PLACEHOLDER__ plumbing; the WS URL is derived from location

Daemon / WS
- parse Sec-WebSocket-Protocol manually (web.Request.get_subprotocols
  does not exist in aiohttp 3.13); X-Auth-Token is a custom-nginx
  fallback only — docstring and security docs corrected

Install / system
- bootstrap_auth.py is now idempotent: preserves existing auth config
  and syncs the admin password on re-runs (new reset_password helper)
- WebUI server block renders auth_basic off (the UI is JWT-protected)
- install.sh chown/chmod skips .git to avoid git dubious-ownership
  breakage
- tolerate unreadable /etc/wireguard during system import

Contracts / docs
- create_user returns 409 on duplicate username per docs/api.md
- correct docs/api.md response shapes, docs/security.md blacklist
  cleanup wording + one-refresh-per-user caveat, stale WS-URL
  references, and the .htpasswd description

Tests: +7 regression tests (rotation/logout revocation, crafted-token
401, concurrent seeding); placeholder-substitution tests replaced with
serve-as-is SPA root tests.

webui/static/hoover/api.js

@@ -12,6 +12,21 @@ import { getAuthToken, getAuthData, refreshAuth } from './auth_model.js';
 import { requestUpdate } from './reactivity.js';
 import { isModalProcessing, setModalProcessing, refreshModals } from './components/modal.js';
 
+/**
+ * Public auth endpoints that may legitimately 401 (bad credentials) while a
+ * valid session exists elsewhere. 401 recovery (refresh → retry → logout)
+ * is skipped for these so a failed login doesn't tear down a live session.
+ */
+const _PUBLIC_AUTH_URLS = new Set([
+    '/api/auth/login',
+    '/api/auth/webauthn/authenticate-begin',
+    '/api/auth/webauthn/authenticate-finish',
+]);
+
+function _isPublicAuthUrl(url) {
+    return _PUBLIC_AUTH_URLS.has(String(url).split('?')[0]);
+}
+
 /**
  * JSON-friendly fetch wrapper.
  *
@@ -49,7 +64,7 @@ export async function apiFetch(url, options = {}) {
         if (safeOpts.signal?.aborted) {
             return { ok: false, data: null, error: 'Aborted', status: 0 };
         }
-        if (res.status === 401 && token) {
+        if (res.status === 401 && token && !_isPublicAuthUrl(url)) {
             await refreshAuth();
             const auth = getAuthData();
             if (auth?.token) {