fix: auth review fixes — token revocation, WS auth, seeding, and hardening
Refresh/logout and token robustness - drop the post-rotation refresh_tokens row delete in auth_refresh so logout blacklists the current (rotated) refresh token; remove the dead _clear_refresh_token_after_rotation helper and clear_active_refresh_token - reject non-object JWT payloads in _extract_unverified_sub so crafted Authorization headers return 401 instead of crashing with 500 SQLite user store - make builtin-admin seeding idempotent: on a concurrent first start the losing seeder re-checks, finds the winner, and returns instead of raising IntegrityError - per-thread sqlite connections + busy_timeout so Flask worker threads don't hit cross-thread ProgrammingError / SQLITE_BUSY - add LogsDirectory + /var/log/vacuum-wall to ReadWritePaths in both systemd units so the fallback admin password actually lands on disk Frontend - skip apiFetch 401-recovery for public auth endpoints so a failed login no longer logs out a valid session - add /passkeys to the nav (passkey registration was unreachable); remove the dead checkWebAuthnCapable export - drop the CSP-blocked inline WS-URL script and the __WS_URL_PLACEHOLDER__ plumbing; the WS URL is derived from location Daemon / WS - parse Sec-WebSocket-Protocol manually (web.Request.get_subprotocols does not exist in aiohttp 3.13); X-Auth-Token is a custom-nginx fallback only — docstring and security docs corrected Install / system - bootstrap_auth.py is now idempotent: preserves existing auth config and syncs the admin password on re-runs (new reset_password helper) - WebUI server block renders auth_basic off (the UI is JWT-protected) - install.sh chown/chmod skips .git to avoid git dubious-ownership breakage - tolerate unreadable /etc/wireguard during system import Contracts / docs - create_user returns 409 on duplicate username per docs/api.md - correct docs/api.md response shapes, docs/security.md blacklist cleanup wording + one-refresh-per-user caveat, stale WS-URL references, and the .htpasswd description Tests: +7 regression tests (rotation/logout revocation, crafted-token 401, concurrent seeding); placeholder-substitution tests replaced with serve-as-is SPA root tests.
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@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@
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* - WebAuthn (passkey) ceremony helpers — not state management
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*/
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import { apiFetch } from '../api.js';
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import { modelFetch } from '../model.js';
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import { getAuthData } from '../auth_model.js';
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@@ -65,20 +64,6 @@ export function webauthnSupported() {
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return typeof window !== 'undefined' && !!window.PublicKeyCredential;
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}
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/**
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* Check if WebAuthn is enabled and available on the current domain.
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* Calls GET /api/auth/webauthn/capable to query the server.
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*
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* @returns {Promise<object>} { enabled, rp_id, rp_name, origin, reason? }
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*/
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export async function checkWebAuthnCapable() {
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const result = await apiFetch('/api/auth/webauthn/capable');
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if (!result.ok) {
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return { enabled: false, reason: 'Unable to check WebAuthn capability' };
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}
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return result.data || { enabled: false, reason: 'Server returned no data' };
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}
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/* ─── Base64url helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────── */
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/**
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