fix: daemon /run spawn hardening, auth guard before first paint, WS refresh cap, interfaces runtime state
systemd: pre-create volatile /run paths so vacuum-walld's ProtectSystem=strict namespace setup cannot fail with 226/NAMESPACE — RuntimeDirectory=vacuum-wall nginx plus a tmpfiles.d spec (installed to /etc/tmpfiles.d/) covering /run/firewalld and /run/nginx.pid. Drop /run/sudo from ReadWritePaths: NOPASSWD children never need it, and its absence crash-looped restarts after sudo removed /run/sudo.
webui: run the auth session check before mounting the shell so logged-out visitors never flash the sidebar or a protected page; router guard and sidebar now react to auth state, and the login page renders full-bleed.
ws: cap refresh->reconnect episodes at 2 consecutive failures; if the WS path stays dead after a token refresh, abandon reconnection instead of looping refreshAuth forever (UI keeps working via REST until reload).
api: GET /api/network/interfaces now includes loopback and returns per-interface {config, runtime}; dashboard reads runtime.state (carrier counts as up) and the interfaces page filters lo client-side.
daemon: re-collect nginx state after lazy config migration (cached list went stale when the on-disk format changed under it), skip system_import.nginx when config.json already exists (re-parsing vacuum-wall's own generated sites is lossy), and poll nginx (60s) / acme (300s) state so file drift self-heals.
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+3
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@@ -145,8 +145,9 @@ Both `vacuum-wall.service` (WebUI) and `vacuum-walld.service` (daemon) apply com
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| Directive | Value | Effect |
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|---|---|---|
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| `ProtectSystem` | `strict` | Mounts the entire file system as read-only, except explicitly allowed paths |
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| `ReadWritePaths` | project dir, `/tmp`, `/run/vacuum-wall`, and (WebUI only) `config/`, `data/` subdirs | The project directory and runtime paths are writable |
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| `RuntimeDirectory` | `vacuum-wall` (daemon only) | Creates `/run/vacuum-wall` owned by the daemon user; removed on stop |
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| `ReadWritePaths` | project dir, `/tmp`, the generated `/etc` config dirs, and the volatile `/run` entries (`/run/vacuum-wall`, `/run/firewalld`, `/run/nginx`); (WebUI only) `config/`, `data/` subdirs | The project directory and runtime paths are writable. Every entry must **exist** when the unit spawns or namespace setup fails (`226/NAMESPACE`), so volatile `/run` entries are pre-created by systemd (see below). Only paths the unit genuinely writes are listed — e.g. `/run/sudo` was historically listed but is now omitted because the NOPASSWD sudo children never need it |
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| `RuntimeDirectory` | `vacuum-wall nginx` (daemon only) | Creates `/run/vacuum-wall` and `/run/nginx` owned by the daemon user before namespace setup; removed on stop |
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| tmpfiles.d spec | `system/tmpfiles.d/vacuum-wall.conf` (installed to `/etc/tmpfiles.d/`, applied at early boot by `systemd-tmpfiles-setup.service`) | Pre-creates the root-owned `/run/firewalld` at early boot so the daemon's `ReadWritePaths=` entries resolve on a fresh boot (in practice firewalld, which starts first, creates the directory itself) |
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| `PrivateTmp` | `yes` | Provides a private `/tmp` and `/var/tmp` namespace |
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| `NoNewPrivileges` | `yes` | Prevents the process from gaining new privileges via `setuid`/`setgid` |
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| `PrivateDevices` | `yes` | Hides all device files under `/dev` |
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