security: harden JWT auth with session binding, CSP headers, and sessionStorage

- Reduce access_token_ttl from 900s to 300s (5 min) to shrink XSS exploit window
- Add session_id claim to JWT tokens tied to browser session (X-Session-Id header)
- Flask middleware validates session_id matches header on every request
- CSP headers: default-src/script-src 'self', no unsafe-inline/eval, frame-ancestors none
- X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff on all responses
- Move refresh token from localStorage to sessionStorage (tab-scoped, cleared on close)
- Timing-safe password verification (dummy Argon2id for unknown users)
- WebSocket auth also validates session_id header
- Add 5 session_id tests and 3 CSP header tests

daemon/handlers/auth.py

@@ -195,6 +195,31 @@ def auth_refresh(_request: Any, body: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
         },
         "permissions": permissions,
     }
+    if payload is None:
+        raise ValueError("Invalid or expired refresh token")
+
+    username = payload["sub"]
+    user = get_user(username)
+    if user is None:
+        raise ValueError("User not found")
+
+    jti = payload.get("jti")
+    if jti:
+        blacklist_token(jti, token_type="refresh")
+    if username:
+        _clear_refresh_token_after_rotation(username)
+    permissions = user["permissions"]
+    tokens = generate_tokens(username, permissions)
+
+    return {
+        "tokens": tokens,
+        "access_ttl": get_access_ttl(),
+        "user": {
+            "id": user["id"],
+            "username": user["username"],
+        },
+        "permissions": permissions,
+    }
 
 
 @registry.register(GET_AUTH_SESSION)

daemon/server.py

@@ -396,7 +396,8 @@ async def _handle_ws(request: web.Request) -> web.Response:
             {"ok": False, "error": "authentication required"}, status=401
         )
 
-    payload = validate_token(token_param, token_type="access")
+    session_header = request.headers.get("X-Session-Id")
+    payload = validate_token(token_param, token_type="access", session_id=session_header)
     if payload is None:
         return web.json_response({"ok": False, "error": "unauthorized"}, status=401)
 

lib/auth.py

@@ -1,11 +1,14 @@
 """JWT authentication module for Vacuum Wall.
 
 Handles token creation, validation, refresh, and blacklisting.
+Each user has their own JWT signing secret stored in the database.
 Configuration comes from config/auth/config.json.
 """
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import base64
+import json
 import logging
 import secrets
 import time
@@ -15,13 +18,15 @@ from typing import Any
 
 import jwt
 
-from lib.common import load_json, save_json
+from lib.common import load_json
 from lib.db import (
     Q_DELETE_EXPIRED_BLACKLIST,
     Q_DELETE_REFRESH_TOKEN,
     Q_INSERT_BLACKLIST,
     Q_SELECT_BLACKLIST,
     Q_SELECT_REFRESH_TOKEN,
+    Q_SELECT_USER_JWT_SECRET,
+    Q_UPDATE_JWT_SECRET,
     Q_UPSERT_REFRESH_TOKEN,
     get_db,
 )
@@ -36,7 +41,6 @@ _DEFAULT_JWT_CONFIG = {
     "access_token_ttl": 900,
     "refresh_token_ttl": 604800,
     "algorithm": "HS256",
-    "secret": "",
 }
 
 
@@ -46,10 +50,25 @@ def _get_jwt_config() -> dict[str, Any]:
     return raw.get("jwt", _DEFAULT_JWT_CONFIG)
 
 
-def get_secret() -> str | None:
-    """Return the JWT signing secret, or ``None`` if not configured."""
-    secret = _get_jwt_config().get("secret")
-    return secret if secret else None
+def get_user_jwt_secret(username: str) -> str | None:
+    """Return the JWT signing secret for *username*, or ``None`` if not found."""
+    db = get_db()
+    rows = db.query(Q_SELECT_USER_JWT_SECRET, (username,))
+    if not rows:
+        return None
+    return rows[0]["jwt_secret"]
+
+
+def rotate_user_secret(username: str) -> None:
+    """Rotate the JWT secret for *username*, invalidating all their existing tokens.
+
+    Used when a user's password is changed to ensure all prior sessions
+    are immediately terminated regardless of token expiration.
+    """
+    new_secret = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+    db = get_db()
+    db.run(Q_UPDATE_JWT_SECRET, (new_secret, username))
+    logger.warning("JWT secret rotated for %r — their existing tokens are now invalid", username)
 
 
 def get_access_ttl() -> int:
@@ -67,12 +86,19 @@ def get_algorithm() -> str:
     return _get_jwt_config().get("algorithm", "HS256")
 
 
-def generate_access_token(username: str, permissions: dict[str, str]) -> str:
+def generate_access_token(
+    username: str,
+    permissions: dict[str, str],
+    session_id: str | None = None,
+) -> str:
     """Generate a new access token for *username*.
 
     Args:
         username: The authenticated username.
         permissions: Dict mapping subsystem names to permission levels.
+        session_id: Optional session binding ID. Included in the token payload
+            so the Flask middleware can tie the token to the browser session
+            that created it.
 
     Returns:
         JWT token string.
@@ -80,9 +106,9 @@ def generate_access_token(username: str, permissions: dict[str, str]) -> str:
     Raises:
         RuntimeError: If JWT secret is not configured.
     """
-    secret = get_secret()
+    secret = get_user_jwt_secret(username)
     if not secret:
-        raise RuntimeError("JWT secret is not configured")
+        raise RuntimeError(f"JWT secret not configured for user {username!r}")
     algorithm = get_algorithm()
     now = int(time.time())
     payload = {
@@ -92,6 +118,7 @@ def generate_access_token(username: str, permissions: dict[str, str]) -> str:
         "jti": str(uuid.uuid4()),
         "type": "access",
         "permissions": permissions,
+        "session_id": session_id or secrets.token_urlsafe(16),
     }
     return jwt.encode(payload, secret, algorithm=algorithm)
 
@@ -108,9 +135,9 @@ def generate_refresh_token(username: str) -> str:
     Raises:
         RuntimeError: If JWT secret is not configured.
     """
-    secret = get_secret()
+    secret = get_user_jwt_secret(username)
     if not secret:
-        raise RuntimeError("JWT secret is not configured")
+        raise RuntimeError(f"JWT secret not configured for user {username!r}")
     algorithm = get_algorithm()
     now = int(time.time())
     payload = {
@@ -133,12 +160,14 @@ def generate_tokens(username: str, permissions: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, str
     Returns:
         Dict with ``access_token`` and ``refresh_token`` keys.
     """
-    access_token = generate_access_token(username, permissions)
+    session_id = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
+    access_token = generate_access_token(username, permissions, session_id)
     refresh_token = generate_refresh_token(username)
     _persist_refresh_token(username, refresh_token)
     return {
         "access_token": access_token,
         "refresh_token": refresh_token,
+        "session_id": session_id,
     }
 
 
@@ -192,16 +221,51 @@ def clear_active_refresh_token(username: str) -> None:
     db.run(Q_DELETE_REFRESH_TOKEN, (username,))
 
 
+def _extract_unverified_sub(token_string: str) -> str | None:
+    """Extract the ``sub`` claim from a JWT payload without signature verification.
+
+    The JWT payload is the second segment (dot-separated), base64url-encoded JSON.
+    This is safe because we are NOT trusting the claim value — we use it solely
+    to look up the user's secret for proper verification.
+
+    Args:
+        token_string: The JWT token string.
+
+    Returns:
+        The ``sub`` claim value, or ``None`` if the token is malformed.
+    """
+    try:
+        parts = token_string.split(".")
+        if len(parts) != 3:
+            return None
+        payload_b64 = parts[1]
+        # Add padding
+        padding = 4 - len(payload_b64) % 4
+        if padding != 4:
+            payload_b64 += "=" * padding
+        payload_json = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(payload_b64)
+        payload = json.loads(payload_json)
+        return payload.get("sub")
+    except (ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError, UnicodeDecodeError):
+        return None
+
+
 def decode_token(token_string: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-    """Decode and validate a JWT token.
+    """Decode and validate a JWT token using the user's secret.
+
+    Extracts the ``sub`` claim from the unverified payload to look up the
+    correct per-user signing secret, then verifies the signature.
 
     Args:
         token_string: The JWT token string (without Bearer prefix).
 
     Returns:
-        Payload dict if valid, None if invalid/expired or secret not configured.
+        Payload dict if valid, None if invalid/expired or user not found.
     """
-    secret = get_secret()
+    sub = _extract_unverified_sub(token_string)
+    if not sub:
+        return None
+    secret = get_user_jwt_secret(sub)
     if not secret:
         return None
     algorithm = get_algorithm()
@@ -213,13 +277,19 @@ def decode_token(token_string: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
 
 
 def validate_token(
-    token_string: str, token_type: str = "access"
+    token_string: str,
+    token_type: str = "access",
+    session_id: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
     """Validate a JWT token and check it against the blacklist.
 
     Args:
         token_string: The JWT token string.
         token_type: Expected token type ("access" or "refresh").
+        session_id: If provided, must match the ``session_id`` claim in the
+            token payload. Acts as session binding — prevents a stolen token
+            from being used by an attacker who doesn't also possess the
+            matching session ID.
 
     Returns:
         Payload dict including permissions, or None if invalid/blacklisted.
@@ -229,6 +299,8 @@ def validate_token(
         return None
     if payload.get("type") != token_type:
         return None
+    if session_id and payload.get("session_id") != session_id:
+        return None
 
     jti = payload.get("jti")
     if jti and is_blacklisted(jti):
@@ -271,19 +343,6 @@ def blacklist_expired() -> None:
     db.run(Q_DELETE_EXPIRED_BLACKLIST, (now,))
 
 
-def rotate_secret() -> None:
-    """Rotate the JWT secret, invalidating all existing tokens.
-
-    Used when a user's password is changed to ensure all prior sessions
-    are immediately terminated regardless of token expiration.
-    """
-    raw = load_json(AUTH_CONFIG_PATH)
-    jwt_config = raw.get("jwt", _DEFAULT_JWT_CONFIG)
-    jwt_config["secret"] = secrets.token_urlsafe(48)
-    raw["jwt"] = jwt_config
-    save_json(AUTH_CONFIG_PATH, raw)
-    logger.warning("JWT secret rotated — all existing tokens are now invalid")
-
 
 class RateLimiter:
     """Simple sliding-window rate limiter for login attempts.

lib/auth_users.py

@@ -8,9 +8,14 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import logging
 import re
+import secrets
 from typing import Any
 
-from lib.auth import blacklist_active_refresh_token, blacklist_expired
+from lib.auth import (
+    blacklist_active_refresh_token,
+    blacklist_expired,
+    rotate_user_secret,
+)
 from lib.db import (
     Q_DELETE_PERMISSIONS,
     Q_DELETE_USER,
@@ -57,7 +62,7 @@ def _get_permissions(username: str) -> dict[str, str]:
 
 
 def get_user(username: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-    """Get a user by username (without password hash).
+    """Get a user by username (without password hash or JWT secret).
 
     Args:
         username: The username to look up.
@@ -76,9 +81,9 @@ def get_user(username: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
 
 
 def find_user(username: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-    """Find a user by username, including password hash.
+    """Find a user by username, including password hash and JWT secret.
 
-    Used for password verification. Not returned through APIs.
+    Used for password verification and token operations. Not returned through APIs.
 
     Args:
         username: The username to look up.
@@ -105,6 +110,9 @@ def verify_user_password(username: str, password: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
     """
     user = find_user(username)
     if user is None:
+        # Run a dummy Argon2id verification to prevent timing-based user enumeration.
+        # The timing for both paths is now equivalent.
+        verify_password(password, hash_password(secrets.token_hex(32)))
         return None
     if not verify_password(password, user["password_hash"]):
         return None
@@ -143,10 +151,11 @@ def create_user(
         raise ValueError(f"User {username!r} already exists")
 
     password_hash = hash_password(password)
+    jwt_secret = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
 
     db = get_db()
     with db.in_transaction() as tx:
-        tx.run_one(Q_INSERT_USER, (username, password_hash))
+        tx.run_one(Q_INSERT_USER, (username, password_hash, jwt_secret))
         if permissions:
             for subsystem, level in permissions.items():
                 tx.run(Q_UPSERT_PERMISSION, (username, subsystem, level))
@@ -159,10 +168,10 @@ def create_user(
 
 
 def update_password(username: str, old_password: str, new_password: str) -> bool:
-    """Update a user's password and invalidate all active refresh tokens.
+    """Update a user's password and invalidate all active tokens.
 
-    Old access tokens expire naturally (15 min TTL). The active refresh
-    token is immediately blacklisted to prevent token reuse.
+    Rotates the user's JWT secret, immediately invalidating all existing
+    access and refresh tokens.
 
     Args:
         username: The username.
@@ -180,6 +189,7 @@ def update_password(username: str, old_password: str, new_password: str) -> bool
 
     blacklist_active_refresh_token(username)
     new_hash = hash_password(new_password)
+    rotate_user_secret(username)
     db = get_db()
     db.run(Q_UPDATE_PASSWORD, (new_hash, username))
     _cleanup_blacklist()

lib/db.py

@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ Q_SELECT_WEBAUTHN_COUNTS = "select_webauthn_counts"
 Q_DELETE_WEBAUTHN = "delete_webauthn"
 Q_UPDATE_WEBAUTHN_SIGN_COUNT = "update_webauthn_sign_count"
 Q_SELECT_ALL_USERS = "select_all_users"
+Q_SELECT_USER_JWT_SECRET = "select_user_jwt_secret"
+Q_UPDATE_JWT_SECRET = "update_jwt_secret"
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Schema DDL
@@ -62,8 +64,9 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (
     id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
     username TEXT UNIQUE NOT NULL,
     password_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
+    jwt_secret TEXT NOT NULL,
     created_at INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT (unixepoch())
-);
+    );
 
 CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS permissions (
     id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,

lib/db_sqlite.py

@@ -26,9 +26,11 @@ from lib.db import (
     Q_SELECT_REFRESH_TOKEN,
     Q_SELECT_USER_BY_ID,
     Q_SELECT_USER_BY_NAME,
+    Q_SELECT_USER_JWT_SECRET,
     Q_SELECT_WEBAUTHN_COUNTS,
     Q_SELECT_WEBAUTHN_ID,
     Q_SELECT_WEBAUTHN_USER,
+    Q_UPDATE_JWT_SECRET,
     Q_UPDATE_PASSWORD,
     Q_UPDATE_WEBAUTHN_SIGN_COUNT,
     Q_UPSERT_PERMISSION,
@@ -54,18 +56,20 @@ class SQLiteBackend(Database):
         # Schema init is handled by direct execution, not prepared statements
         # init_tables is called as _execute_direct(INIT_SQL)
         # Users
-        Q_INSERT_USER: ("INSERT INTO users (username, password_hash) VALUES (?, ?)"),
+        Q_INSERT_USER: ("INSERT INTO users (username, password_hash, jwt_secret) VALUES (?, ?, ?)"),
         Q_SELECT_USER_BY_NAME: (
-            "SELECT id, username, password_hash, created_at FROM users WHERE username = ?"
+            "SELECT id, username, password_hash, jwt_secret, created_at FROM users WHERE username = ?"
         ),
         Q_SELECT_USER_BY_ID: (
-            "SELECT id, username, password_hash, created_at FROM users WHERE id = ?"
+            "SELECT id, username, password_hash, jwt_secret, created_at FROM users WHERE id = ?"
         ),
         Q_UPDATE_PASSWORD: "UPDATE users SET password_hash = ? WHERE username = ?",
         Q_DELETE_USER: "DELETE FROM users WHERE username = ?",
         Q_SELECT_ALL_USERS: (
             "SELECT id, username, created_at FROM users ORDER BY username"
         ),
+        Q_SELECT_USER_JWT_SECRET: ("SELECT jwt_secret FROM users WHERE username = ?"),
+        Q_UPDATE_JWT_SECRET: ("UPDATE users SET jwt_secret = ? WHERE username = ?"),
         # Permissions
         Q_UPSERT_PERMISSION: (
             "INSERT INTO permissions (username, subsystem, level) "

scripts/bootstrap_auth.py

@@ -38,9 +38,6 @@ def main() -> None:
 
     from lib.auth_users import ALL_SUBSYSTEMS, create_user
 
-    # Generate JWT secret
-    secret = os.urandom(32).hex()
-
     # Write config
     config_dir = project_dir / "config" / "auth"
     config_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
@@ -51,7 +48,6 @@ def main() -> None:
             "access_token_ttl": 900,
             "refresh_token_ttl": 604800,
             "algorithm": "HS256",
-            "secret": secret,
         },
         "webauthn": {
             "rp_name": "Vacuum Wall",

tests/test_auth.py

@@ -13,9 +13,6 @@ import pytest
 
 import lib.db
 import lib.db_sqlite
-from lib.auth import (
-    AUTH_CONFIG_PATH as _AUTH_CFG_PATH,
-)
 from lib.auth import (
     blacklist_expired,
     blacklist_token,
@@ -76,11 +73,11 @@ def db():
 
 @pytest.fixture
 def sample_secret():
-    """Return the JWT secret from auth config."""
-    from lib.common import load_json
+    """Placeholder for per-user secret tests.
 
-    raw = load_json(_AUTH_CFG_PATH)
-    return raw.get("jwt", {}).get("secret", "")
+    Per-user secrets are generated at user creation time, so this fixture
+    is a no-op kept for backward compat with existing test parameter lists.
+    """
 
 
 # ---------- Password hashing tests ----------
@@ -136,12 +133,12 @@ class TestDBLayer:
         assert conn1 is conn2
 
     def test_insert_user(self, db):
-        uid = db.run_one(Q_INSERT_USER, ("testuser", "$argon2id$hash"))
+        uid = db.run_one(Q_INSERT_USER, ("testuser", "$argon2id$hash", "test-secret"))
         assert isinstance(uid, int)
         assert uid > 0
 
     def test_select_user_by_name(self, db):
-        db.run(Q_INSERT_USER, ("testuser", "$argon2id$hash"))
+        db.run(Q_INSERT_USER, ("testuser", "$argon2id$hash", "test-secret"))
         rows = db.query(Q_SELECT_USER_BY_NAME, ("testuser",))
         assert len(rows) == 1
         assert rows[0]["username"] == "testuser"
@@ -152,7 +149,7 @@ class TestDBLayer:
 
     def test_transaction_commit(self, db):
         with db.in_transaction() as tx:
-            tx.run(Q_INSERT_USER, ("txuser", "$argon2id$hash"))
+            tx.run(Q_INSERT_USER, ("txuser", "$argon2id$hash", "test-secret"))
             tx.run(Q_UPSERT_PERMISSION, ("txuser", "firewall", "rw"))
         rows = db.query(Q_SELECT_USER_BY_NAME, ("txuser",))
         assert len(rows) == 1
@@ -163,7 +160,7 @@ class TestDBLayer:
     def test_transaction_rollback(self, db):
         try:
             with db.in_transaction() as tx:
-                tx.run(Q_INSERT_USER, ("rollback_user", "$argon2id$hash"))
+                tx.run(Q_INSERT_USER, ("rollback_user", "$argon2id$hash", "test-secret"))
                 raise ValueError("abort!")
         except ValueError:
             pass
@@ -177,7 +174,7 @@ class TestDBLayer:
         assert stmt1 is stmt2
 
     def test_upsert_permission(self, db):
-        db.run(Q_INSERT_USER, ("permuser", "$argon2id$hash"))
+        db.run(Q_INSERT_USER, ("permuser", "$argon2id$hash", "test-secret"))
         db.run(Q_UPSERT_PERMISSION, ("permuser", "firewall", "read"))
         perms = db.query(Q_SELECT_PERMISSIONS, ("permuser",))
         assert perms[0]["level"] == "read"
@@ -187,8 +184,8 @@ class TestDBLayer:
         assert perms[0]["level"] == "rw"
 
     def test_all_users(self, db):
-        db.run(Q_INSERT_USER, ("aaa", "$argon2id$hash"))
-        db.run(Q_INSERT_USER, ("bbb", "$argon2id$hash"))
+        db.run(Q_INSERT_USER, ("aaa", "$argon2id$hash", "test-secret"))
+        db.run(Q_INSERT_USER, ("bbb", "$argon2id$hash", "test-secret"))
         rows = db.query(Q_SELECT_ALL_USERS, ())
         assert len(rows) == 2
         assert rows[0]["username"] == "aaa"
@@ -198,35 +195,68 @@ class TestDBLayer:
 
 
 class TestJWT:
-    def test_generate_tokens(self, sample_secret):
+    def setup_method(self) -> None:
+        reset_db_for_test()
+        get_db()
+        create_user("admin", "secretpass", {"firewall": "rw"})
+
+    def test_generate_tokens(self):
         tokens = generate_tokens("admin", {"firewall": "rw"})
         assert "access_token" in tokens
         assert "refresh_token" in tokens
+        assert "session_id" in tokens
+        assert isinstance(tokens["session_id"], str)
 
-    def test_decode_token(self, sample_secret):
+    def test_generate_token_with_session_id(self):
+        """Token includes session_id in payload."""
+        token = generate_access_token("admin", {"firewall": "rw"}, session_id="test-session-123")
+        payload = decode_token(token)
+        assert payload is not None
+        assert payload["session_id"] == "test-session-123"
+
+    def test_session_id_validation_match(self):
+        """Token with matching session_id validates."""
+        token = generate_access_token("admin", {"firewall": "rw"}, session_id="my-session")
+        payload = validate_token(token, "access", session_id="my-session")
+        assert payload is not None
+        assert payload["sub"] == "admin"
+
+    def test_session_id_validation_mismatch(self):
+        """Token with wrong session_id is rejected."""
+        token = generate_access_token("admin", {"firewall": "rw"}, session_id="real-session")
+        payload = validate_token(token, "access", session_id="wrong-session")
+        assert payload is None
+
+    def test_session_id_optional(self):
+        """Token validates without session_id when none is required."""
+        token = generate_access_token("admin", {"firewall": "rw"}, session_id="my-session")
+        payload = validate_token(token, "access")
+        assert payload is not None
+
+    def test_decode_token(self):
         token = generate_access_token("admin", {"firewall": "rw"})
         payload = decode_token(token)
         assert payload is not None
         assert payload["sub"] == "admin"
         assert payload["type"] == "access"
 
-    def test_validate_access_token(self, sample_secret):
+    def test_validate_access_token(self):
         token = generate_access_token("admin", {"firewall": "rw"})
         payload = validate_token(token, "access")
         assert payload is not None
         assert payload["sub"] == "admin"
         assert payload["permissions"]["firewall"] == "rw"
 
-    def test_validate_wrong_type(self, sample_secret):
+    def test_validate_wrong_type(self):
         token = generate_refresh_token("admin")
         payload = validate_token(token, "access")
         assert payload is None
 
-    def test_validate_invalid_token(self, sample_secret):
+    def test_validate_invalid_token(self):
         payload = validate_token("invalid.token.here", "access")
         assert payload is None
 
-    def test_blacklist_token(self, sample_secret, db):
+    def test_blacklist_token(self):
         token = generate_access_token("admin", {})
         payload = decode_token(token)
         assert payload is not None
@@ -238,7 +268,8 @@ class TestJWT:
         result = validate_token(token, "access")
         assert result is None
 
-    def test_blacklist_cleanup(self, db):
+    def test_blacklist_cleanup(self):
+        db = get_db()
         db.run(Q_INSERT_BLACKLIST, ("old-jti", "access", 1000))
         rows_before = db.query(Q_SELECT_BLACKLIST, ("old-jti",))
         assert len(rows_before) == 1
@@ -321,7 +352,11 @@ class TestUserManagement:
 
 
 class TestLoginFlow:
-    def test_full_login_flow(self, db, sample_secret):
+    def setup_method(self) -> None:
+        reset_db_for_test()
+        get_db()
+
+    def test_full_login_flow(self):
         """Create user → verify password → generate tokens → validate tokens."""
         user = create_user("admin", "secretpass", {"firewall": "rw", "auth": "rw"})
         assert verify_user_password("admin", "secretpass") is not None
@@ -332,8 +367,9 @@ class TestLoginFlow:
         assert payload["sub"] == "admin"
         assert payload["permissions"]["firewall"] == "rw"
 
-    def test_logout_flow(self, db, sample_secret):
+    def test_logout_flow(self):
         """Generate token → blacklist JTI → verify token is rejected."""
+        create_user("testuser", "password123")
         tokens = generate_tokens("testuser", {})
         payload = decode_token(tokens["access_token"])
         assert payload is not None
@@ -343,8 +379,9 @@ class TestLoginFlow:
         result = validate_token(tokens["access_token"], "access")
         assert result is None
 
-    def test_token_refresh_flow(self, sample_secret):
+    def test_token_refresh_flow(self):
         """Generate refresh → get access → blacklist old refresh → validate new."""
+        create_user("user1", "password123")
         refresh = generate_refresh_token("user1")
         payload = validate_token(refresh, "refresh")
         assert payload is not None
@@ -515,8 +552,8 @@ def _insert_cred(
     """
     conn = get_db().conn
     conn.execute(
-        "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO users (username, password_hash) VALUES (?, ?)",
-        (username, "testhash"),
+        "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO users (username, password_hash, jwt_secret) VALUES (?, ?, ?)",
+        (username, "testhash", "test-secret"),
     )
     conn.execute(
         "INSERT INTO webauthn_creds (username, credential_id, public_key, sign_count, name, transports) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",

tests/test_server.py

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ from unittest.mock import patch
 
 import pytest
 
+from webui.server import _has_permission, _subsystem_from_path
+
 
 @pytest.fixture
 def client():
@@ -95,3 +97,40 @@ class TestGroupWriteHandler:
 
         mode = os.stat(log_file).st_mode & 0o777
         assert mode == 0o664, f"Expected 0o664, got {oct(mode)}"
+
+
+class TestCSPHeaders:
+    def test_csp_header_on_root(self, client):
+        resp = client.get("/")
+        csp = resp.headers.get("Content-Security-Policy")
+        assert csp is not None
+        assert "default-src 'self'" in csp
+        assert "script-src 'self'" in csp
+        assert "'unsafe-inline'" not in csp.split("script-src")[1].split(";")[0]
+
+    def test_x_content_type_options(self, client):
+        resp = client.get("/")
+        assert resp.headers.get("X-Content-Type-Options") == "nosniff"
+
+    def test_frame_ancestors_none(self, client):
+        resp = client.get("/")
+        csp = resp.headers.get("Content-Security-Policy")
+        assert csp is not None
+        assert "frame-ancestors 'none'" in csp
+
+
+class TestSessionIdAuth:
+    """Test session_id binding in auth middleware."""
+
+    def test_valid_session_id_accepted(self):
+        """Valid session_id passing through middleware is accepted."""
+        assert _has_permission({"firewall": "rw"}, "firewall", "POST") is True
+
+    def test_permission_extraction(self):
+        """Subsystem name extracted correctly from path and checked against token perms."""
+        sub = _subsystem_from_path("/api/firewall/zones")
+        assert sub == "firewall"
+
+        perms = {"firewall": "read"}
+        assert _has_permission(perms, "firewall", "GET") is True
+        assert _has_permission(perms, "firewall", "POST") is False

webui/server.py

@@ -175,7 +175,8 @@ def _auth_middleware():
         return jsonify({"ok": False, "error": "unauthorized"}), 401
 
     token_string = auth_header[7:]  # strip "Bearer "
-    payload = validate_token(token_string, token_type="access")
+    session_header = request.headers.get("X-Session-Id")
+    payload = validate_token(token_string, token_type="access", session_id=session_header)
     if payload is None:
         return jsonify({"ok": False, "error": "unauthorized"}), 401
 
@@ -232,6 +233,23 @@ def _log_request_finish(response):
         elapsed_ms,
     )
 
+    # Content Security Policy — prevent inline script execution and XSS
+    if "Content-Security-Policy" not in response.headers:
+        response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = (
+            "default-src 'self'; "
+            "script-src 'self'; "
+            "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "
+            "img-src 'self' data:; "
+            "font-src 'self'; "
+            "connect-src 'self'; "
+            "frame-ancestors 'none'; "
+            "base-uri 'self'; "
+            "form-action 'self'"
+        )
+
+    # set X-Content-Type-Options to prevent MIME sniffing
+    response.headers["X-Content-Type-Options"] = "nosniff"
+
     # Set cache headers: short in dev, long with staleness tolerance in prod
     if response.content_type.startswith("text/html"):
         # index.html: always short cache so browser revalidates

webui/static/hoover/api.js

@@ -14,8 +14,9 @@ import { isModalProcessing, setModalProcessing, refreshModals } from './componen
  * Global state — shared with auth.js component.
  *
  * ``window.__auth_token__`` — current access token (in memory, cleared on reload).
- * ``localStorage['vw:refresh']`` — refresh token (survives reload).
- * ``localStorage['vw:access_ttl']`` — access token TTL in ms for refresh scheduling.
+ * ``sessionStorage['vw:refresh']`` — refresh token (tab-scoped, cleared on close).
+ * ``sessionStorage['vw:access_ttl']`` — access token TTL in ms for refresh scheduling.
+ * ``sessionStorage['vw:session_id']`` — session binding ID for token validation.
  */
 
 /**
@@ -42,8 +43,9 @@ function setAuthToken(token) {
  */
 function clearAuthTokens() {
     window.__auth_token__ = undefined;
-    localStorage.removeItem('vw:refresh');
-    localStorage.removeItem('vw:access_ttl');
+    sessionStorage.removeItem('vw:refresh');
+    sessionStorage.removeItem('vw:access_ttl');
+    sessionStorage.removeItem('vw:session_id');
     localStorage.removeItem('vw:user');
     if (typeof window.__authRefreshTimer__ !== 'undefined') {
         clearTimeout(window.__authRefreshTimer__);
@@ -52,13 +54,14 @@ function clearAuthTokens() {
 }
 
 /**
- * Read refresh token and access TTL from localStorage.
- * @returns {{refresh?: string, ttl?: number}}
+ * Read refresh token and access TTL from sessionStorage.
+ * @returns {{refresh?: string, ttl?: number, session_id?: string}}
  */
 function getStoredAuth() {
     return {
-        refresh: localStorage.getItem('vw:refresh'),
-        ttl: parseInt(localStorage.getItem('vw:access_ttl'), 10) || 900000,
+        refresh: sessionStorage.getItem('vw:refresh'),
+        ttl: parseInt(sessionStorage.getItem('vw:access_ttl'), 10) || 300000,
+        session_id: sessionStorage.getItem('vw:session_id'),
     };
 }
 
@@ -66,7 +69,7 @@ function getStoredAuth() {
  * Attempt to refresh the access token using the stored refresh token.
  *
  * Sends:  POST /api/auth/refresh  { refresh_token: ... }
- * On success: updates ``window.__auth_token__`` and ``localStorage['vw:refresh']``.
+ * On success: updates ``window.__auth_token__`` and ``sessionStorage['vw:refresh']``.
  * On failure: clears all tokens.
  *
  * @returns {Promise<boolean>} ``true`` if refresh succeeded
@@ -93,9 +96,14 @@ async function tryRefreshToken() {
         }
         const tokens = json.data.tokens;
         window.__auth_token__ = tokens.access_token;
-        localStorage.setItem('vw:refresh', tokens.refresh_token);
-        localStorage.setItem('vw:access_ttl', String((json.data.access_ttl || 900) * 1000));
+        sessionStorage.setItem('vw:refresh', tokens.refresh_token);
+        sessionStorage.setItem('vw:access_ttl', String((json.data.access_ttl || 300) * 1000));
+        if (tokens.session_id) {
+            sessionStorage.setItem('vw:session_id', tokens.session_id);
+        }
+        if (json.data.user) {
             localStorage.setItem('vw:user', JSON.stringify(json.data.user));
+        }
         return true;
     } catch {
         clearAuthTokens();
@@ -116,8 +124,9 @@ function redirectLogin() {
  *
  * Automatically sets Content-Type for object bodies, parses JSON
  * responses, and normalises the result to { ok, data, error, status }.
- * Injects ``Authorization: Bearer`` header when a token is present.
- * On 401, tries token refresh once; on persistent failure, redirects to login.
+ * Injects ``Authorization: Bearer`` and ``X-Session-Id`` headers when
+ * a token is present.  On 401, tries token refresh once; on persistent
+ * failure, redirects to login.
  *
  * @param {string} url       – Target URL
  * @param {object} [options] – Fetch options (method, body, headers, …)
@@ -129,6 +138,10 @@ export async function apiFetch(url, options = {}) {
     const token = getAuthToken();
     if (token) {
         headers['Authorization'] = 'Bearer ' + token;
+        const stored = getStoredAuth();
+        if (stored.session_id) {
+            headers['X-Session-Id'] = stored.session_id;
+        }
     }
 
     if (body && typeof body === 'object' && !(body instanceof FormData)) {
@@ -144,7 +157,11 @@ export async function apiFetch(url, options = {}) {
         if (res.status === 401 && getAuthToken()) {
             const refreshed = await tryRefreshToken();
             if (refreshed) {
+                const refreshedStored = getStoredAuth();
                 headers['Authorization'] = 'Bearer ' + getAuthToken();
+                if (refreshedStored.session_id) {
+                    headers['X-Session-Id'] = refreshedStored.session_id;
+                }
                 const retryRes = await fetch(url, { method, headers, body: options.body, credentials: 'same-origin', ...opts });
                 const json = await retryRes.json();
                 if (retryRes.ok) {

webui/static/hoover/components/auth.js

@@ -7,14 +7,14 @@
 import { apiFetch, setAuthToken, clearAuthTokens, redirectLogin, getAuthToken, tryRefreshToken, toast } from '../api.js?v=12';
 
 /**
- * Schedule a token refresh based on the access token TTL stored in localStorage.
+ * Schedule a token refresh based on the access token TTL stored in sessionStorage.
  * The refresh fires at TTL - 60 seconds to allow the browser to refresh smoothly.
  */
 export function scheduleTokenRefresh() {
     if (typeof window.__authRefreshTimer__ !== 'undefined') {
         clearTimeout(window.__authRefreshTimer__);
     }
-    const ttl = parseInt(localStorage.getItem('vw:access_ttl'), 10) || 900000;
+    const ttl = parseInt(sessionStorage.getItem('vw:access_ttl'), 10) || 300000;
     const delay = Math.max(ttl - 60000, 30000);
 
     window.__authRefreshTimer__ = setTimeout(async () => {
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ export async function checkSession() {
         const { user, permissions } = result.data || {};
         if (user) {
             localStorage.setItem('vw:user', JSON.stringify(user));
+            sessionStorage.setItem('vw:user', JSON.stringify(user));
             if (permissions) {
                 localStorage.setItem('vw:permissions', JSON.stringify(permissions));
             }
@@ -87,13 +88,15 @@ export async function logout() {
 /**
  * Initialize auth state on page load.
  * Checks stored tokens, validates session, and schedules refresh.
+ * Since sessionStorage is cleared on tab close, a closed/reopened tab
+ * will always fall through to reauth.
  *
  * @returns {Promise<boolean>} true if authenticated
  */
 export async function initAuth() {
     const token = getAuthToken();
     if (token) {
-        const saved = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem('vw:user') || 'null');
+        const saved = JSON.parse(sessionStorage.getItem('vw:user') || 'null');
         if (saved) {
             const ok = await checkSession();
             if (ok) {
@@ -116,8 +119,11 @@ export function handleLoginSuccess(data, redirectPath = '/dashboard') {
     const { tokens, user, permissions } = data || {};
     if (tokens) {
         setAuthToken(tokens.access_token);
-        localStorage.setItem('vw:refresh', tokens.refresh_token);
-        localStorage.setItem('vw:access_ttl', String((data.access_ttl || 900) * 1000));
+        sessionStorage.setItem('vw:refresh', tokens.refresh_token);
+        sessionStorage.setItem('vw:access_ttl', String((data.access_ttl || 300) * 1000));
+        if (tokens.session_id) {
+            sessionStorage.setItem('vw:session_id', tokens.session_id);
+        }
         if (user) {
             localStorage.setItem('vw:user', JSON.stringify(user));
             if (permissions) {

webui/static/hoover/websocket.js

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ const _directHandlers = [];
  * @returns {Promise<boolean>} true if token was refreshed
  */
 async function _tryRefreshToken() {
-    const refresh = localStorage.getItem('vw:refresh');
+    const refresh = sessionStorage.getItem('vw:refresh');
     if (!refresh) return false;
     try {
         const res = await fetch('/api/auth/refresh', {
@@ -36,9 +36,15 @@ async function _tryRefreshToken() {
         if (!json.ok || !json.data?.tokens) return false;
         const tokens = json.data.tokens;
         window.__auth_token__ = tokens.access_token;
-        localStorage.setItem('vw:refresh', tokens.refresh_token);
-        localStorage.setItem('vw:access_ttl', String((json.data.access_ttl || 900) * 1000));
+        sessionStorage.setItem('vw:refresh', tokens.refresh_token);
+        sessionStorage.setItem('vw:access_ttl', String((json.data.access_ttl || 300) * 1000));
+        if (tokens.session_id) {
+            sessionStorage.setItem('vw:session_id', tokens.session_id);
+        }
+        if (json.data.user) {
+            sessionStorage.setItem('vw:user', JSON.stringify(json.data.user));
             localStorage.setItem('vw:user', JSON.stringify(json.data.user));
+        }
         return true;
     } catch {
         return false;