12 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
mteehan 0ed275835d fix: auth review fixes — token revocation, WS auth, seeding, and hardening
Refresh/logout and token robustness
- drop the post-rotation refresh_tokens row delete in auth_refresh so
  logout blacklists the current (rotated) refresh token; remove the
  dead _clear_refresh_token_after_rotation helper and clear_active_refresh_token
- reject non-object JWT payloads in _extract_unverified_sub so crafted
  Authorization headers return 401 instead of crashing with 500

SQLite user store
- make builtin-admin seeding idempotent: on a concurrent first start the
  losing seeder re-checks, finds the winner, and returns instead of
  raising IntegrityError
- per-thread sqlite connections + busy_timeout so Flask worker threads
  don't hit cross-thread ProgrammingError / SQLITE_BUSY
- add LogsDirectory + /var/log/vacuum-wall to ReadWritePaths in both
  systemd units so the fallback admin password actually lands on disk

Frontend
- skip apiFetch 401-recovery for public auth endpoints so a failed
  login no longer logs out a valid session
- add /passkeys to the nav (passkey registration was unreachable);
  remove the dead checkWebAuthnCapable export
- drop the CSP-blocked inline WS-URL script and the
  __WS_URL_PLACEHOLDER__ plumbing; the WS URL is derived from location

Daemon / WS
- parse Sec-WebSocket-Protocol manually (web.Request.get_subprotocols
  does not exist in aiohttp 3.13); X-Auth-Token is a custom-nginx
  fallback only — docstring and security docs corrected

Install / system
- bootstrap_auth.py is now idempotent: preserves existing auth config
  and syncs the admin password on re-runs (new reset_password helper)
- WebUI server block renders auth_basic off (the UI is JWT-protected)
- install.sh chown/chmod skips .git to avoid git dubious-ownership
  breakage
- tolerate unreadable /etc/wireguard during system import

Contracts / docs
- create_user returns 409 on duplicate username per docs/api.md
- correct docs/api.md response shapes, docs/security.md blacklist
  cleanup wording + one-refresh-per-user caveat, stale WS-URL
  references, and the .htpasswd description

Tests: +7 regression tests (rotation/logout revocation, crafted-token
401, concurrent seeding); placeholder-substitution tests replaced with
serve-as-is SPA root tests.
2026-08-17 01:45:15 +00:00
mteehan c7593f8a1e fix: close refresh token session binding bypass
Add require_session parameter to validate_token to enforce session_id
matching for refresh operations. Attacker with stolen refresh token can
no longer bypass session binding by omitting session_id from request.

Also adds backend guard against deleting builtin admin user (was only
blocked at Flask blueprint layer), and removes unused _ALL_RW variable.
2026-08-12 20:06:05 +00:00
mteehan 0889ef0d08 fix: prevent data loss in update_permissions and token_refresh
- update_permissions: swap to upsert-first-then-delete-stale so a
  failed upsert mid-loop rolls back cleanly, leaving the user's
  permissions intact. Adds Q_DELETE_PERMISSION_SUBSYSTEM for
  targeted removal.

- auth_refresh: generate and persist the new refresh token before
  blacklisting/clearing the old one, so a failure in generate_tokens
  doesn't leave the user locked out with no valid refresh token.
2026-08-12 16:37:06 +00:00
mteehan 6f728cf853 fix auth: validate logout body, harden WebAuthn, optimize list_users
- Raise ValueError on missing request body in auth_logout
- Add username check in verify_authentication to prevent credential reuse
- Replace N+1 queries in list_users with single JOIN query
2026-08-12 03:58:54 +00:00
mteehan 43b44ad340 fix: add probabilistic cleanup to token blacklist
The blacklist table grew indefinitely since cleanup only ran on
password changes and user deletions. Now each blacklist_token()
call has a 2% chance of triggering blacklist_expired() to prune
expired entries. Redundant cleanup calls in update_password()
and delete_user() are removed.
2026-07-29 03:41:15 +00:00
mteehan 48f8d0be18 Auth: rate limiter, WebAuthn domain awareness, misc fixes
- Rate limiter tracks failures only; success resets counter
- Record failures/successes after password verification, not before
- WebAuthn rp_id/origin resolved dynamically from request domain
- Management domains auto-discovered from nginx backend config
- All WebAuthn operations validate domain against management list
- Add GET /api/auth/webauthn/capable endpoint for frontend checks
- Frontend checkWebAuthnCapable() function for domain-gated UI
- Timing side-channel fix: pre-compute dummy hash at module load
- Builtin admin seeded with random password (logged at WARNING)
- Logout handler returns consistent response shape
2026-07-29 02:48:53 +00:00
mteehan 8ae60ab8cf fix: harden auth and fix frontend issues
- Add builtin admin user with full access, immutable permissions (lib/db.py, lib/auth_users.py, webui/static/pages/users.js)
- Fix passkeys TypeError on string throws (webui/static/pages/passkeys.js)
- Add zero-permission warning in create user modal (webui/static/pages/users.js)
- Restore readonly on proxy paths textarea (webui/static/pages/proxy.js)
- Mask credential ownership errors to prevent enumeration (lib/webauthn.py, tests/test_auth.py)
2026-07-28 18:52:03 +00:00
mteehan a82578f342 fix: invalidate tokens on permission change (medium), optimize create_user query, fix ws reconnect race
- update_permissions now calls blacklist_active_refresh_token and
  rotate_user_secret to immediately invalidate stale tokens
- create_user uses returned id from tx.run_one instead of redundant SELECT
- websocket reconnect explicitly closes old connection after token refresh
  to prevent onclose handler race condition
2026-07-28 18:02:14 +00:00
mteehan cc5679a1cd fix: deduplicate token refresh, serialize concurrent attempts, clean up logout path 2026-07-27 19:15:27 +00:00
mteehan edaf16a433 fix: remove dead auth_refresh code, fix logout storage, align bootstrap TTL, add hash rehash, tighten CSP
- Remove duplicate dead code in daemon/handlers/auth.py (auth_refresh)
- Fix logout reading refresh token from localStorage instead of sessionStorage
- Align bootstrap auth config access_token_ttl (900 -> 300) with hardened default
- Add password hash rehash check on successful login (needs_rehash was unused)
- Remove 'unsafe-inline' from CSP style-src (all styles are applied via JS DOM API)
2026-07-24 03:09:25 +00:00
mteehan a365059976 security: harden JWT auth with session binding, CSP headers, and sessionStorage
- Reduce access_token_ttl from 900s to 300s (5 min) to shrink XSS exploit window
- Add session_id claim to JWT tokens tied to browser session (X-Session-Id header)
- Flask middleware validates session_id matches header on every request
- CSP headers: default-src/script-src 'self', no unsafe-inline/eval, frame-ancestors none
- X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff on all responses
- Move refresh token from localStorage to sessionStorage (tab-scoped, cleared on close)
- Timing-safe password verification (dummy Argon2id for unknown users)
- WebSocket auth also validates session_id header
- Add 5 session_id tests and 3 CSP header tests
2026-07-24 03:09:07 +00:00
mteehan 56b200d233 feat: add auth subsystem with WebAuthn passkeys support
New modules: lib/auth, lib/auth_users, lib/db, lib/db_sqlite, lib/password,
lib/webauthn, daemon/handlers/auth, scripts/bootstrap_auth, tests/test_auth

Frontend: webui/api/auth, hoover/components/auth, pages/login, passkeys, users

Updates: daemon/iface and server, lib/common and nginx, pyproject.toml deps,
install script, server.py, app.js, and websocket/api clients
2026-07-24 01:21:39 +00:00