Refresh/logout and token robustness
- drop the post-rotation refresh_tokens row delete in auth_refresh so
logout blacklists the current (rotated) refresh token; remove the
dead _clear_refresh_token_after_rotation helper and clear_active_refresh_token
- reject non-object JWT payloads in _extract_unverified_sub so crafted
Authorization headers return 401 instead of crashing with 500
SQLite user store
- make builtin-admin seeding idempotent: on a concurrent first start the
losing seeder re-checks, finds the winner, and returns instead of
raising IntegrityError
- per-thread sqlite connections + busy_timeout so Flask worker threads
don't hit cross-thread ProgrammingError / SQLITE_BUSY
- add LogsDirectory + /var/log/vacuum-wall to ReadWritePaths in both
systemd units so the fallback admin password actually lands on disk
Frontend
- skip apiFetch 401-recovery for public auth endpoints so a failed
login no longer logs out a valid session
- add /passkeys to the nav (passkey registration was unreachable);
remove the dead checkWebAuthnCapable export
- drop the CSP-blocked inline WS-URL script and the
__WS_URL_PLACEHOLDER__ plumbing; the WS URL is derived from location
Daemon / WS
- parse Sec-WebSocket-Protocol manually (web.Request.get_subprotocols
does not exist in aiohttp 3.13); X-Auth-Token is a custom-nginx
fallback only — docstring and security docs corrected
Install / system
- bootstrap_auth.py is now idempotent: preserves existing auth config
and syncs the admin password on re-runs (new reset_password helper)
- WebUI server block renders auth_basic off (the UI is JWT-protected)
- install.sh chown/chmod skips .git to avoid git dubious-ownership
breakage
- tolerate unreadable /etc/wireguard during system import
Contracts / docs
- create_user returns 409 on duplicate username per docs/api.md
- correct docs/api.md response shapes, docs/security.md blacklist
cleanup wording + one-refresh-per-user caveat, stale WS-URL
references, and the .htpasswd description
Tests: +7 regression tests (rotation/logout revocation, crafted-token
401, concurrent seeding); placeholder-substitution tests replaced with
serve-as-is SPA root tests.
The warning message referenced 'data/auth.log' but the actual file is
/var/log/vacuum-wall/auth.log. Also add error logging when the write
fails, instead of silently swallowing the OSError.
- update_permissions: swap to upsert-first-then-delete-stale so a
failed upsert mid-loop rolls back cleanly, leaving the user's
permissions intact. Adds Q_DELETE_PERMISSION_SUBSYSTEM for
targeted removal.
- auth_refresh: generate and persist the new refresh token before
blacklisting/clearing the old one, so a failure in generate_tokens
doesn't leave the user locked out with no valid refresh token.
- Truncate admin password in logs; write full password to data/auth.log (0o600)
- Persist access token in sessionStorage so it survives page reloads
- Simplify tryRefreshToken to use GSAP-style promise deduplication
- Remove spurious POST redirect on 401 during token refresh
- Guard passkey button reference in login finally block
- Raise ValueError on missing request body in auth_logout
- Add username check in verify_authentication to prevent credential reuse
- Replace N+1 queries in list_users with single JOIN query
- Rate limiter tracks failures only; success resets counter
- Record failures/successes after password verification, not before
- WebAuthn rp_id/origin resolved dynamically from request domain
- Management domains auto-discovered from nginx backend config
- All WebAuthn operations validate domain against management list
- Add GET /api/auth/webauthn/capable endpoint for frontend checks
- Frontend checkWebAuthnCapable() function for domain-gated UI
- Timing side-channel fix: pre-compute dummy hash at module load
- Builtin admin seeded with random password (logged at WARNING)
- Logout handler returns consistent response shape
mteehan